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POLICY BRIEF
Improving Economic
Development Incentives
Timothy J. Bartik, W.E. Upjohn Institute
BRIEF HIGHLIGHTS
n Business tax incentives are often
costly: only a minority of targeted jobs
are created due to the incentives, and
fiscal benefits offset only a modest
portion of direct costs.
n How incentives are paid for is key
to their net benefits. Education cuts
reduce future wages.
n Incentives are more cost-effective if
targeted at industries that create more
jobs in other local businesses.
n Customized services to small and
medium-sized businesses are a costeffective way to create local jobs.
n Reforming incentives is politically
difficult because there are many large
beneficiaries in the short-run, while
the costs due to lower wages occur
over the long-run.

For more details and recommendations, see
the full report’s Executive Summary, Economic
Development Incentives: Who Benefits? Who
Pays the Costs? How Can They Be Improved?
For additional details, see the full report,
Who Benefits from Economic Development
Incentives?
These can be found at www.upjohn.org.

S
tate and local governments increasingly rely on business incentives, such as job
creation tax credits and property tax abatements, to attract jobs. Costs of incentives have

tripled since 1990, reaching $45 billion per year, or about what state governments take
in from corporate income taxes. Recent incentives to Foxconn and Amazon suggest this
competition may escalate.
Incentives can have large local benefits. If incentives tip a business’s location decision,
this directly creates local jobs. This job creation has “multiplier effects”: other local jobs
are created in supplier industries or retailers. Job growth helps local workers and boosts
tax revenue.
But costs of incentives can be high. If incentives paid for themselves through increased
tax revenue, as economic development agencies often assert, their costs would be no
issue. However, research shows that average-sized incentives tip less than 20 percent of
business location decisions, meaning that over 80 percent of targeted jobs would still
have been created without the incentives. State and local governments thus give away
more than $30 billion a year in incentives that create zero jobs. In addition, local job
growth attracts in-migrants, which increases public spending needs. As a result, the fiscal
benefits from incentives are far less than their direct costs. Budget costs of incentives
must be paid for by higher tax rates or public spending cuts. These budget changes can
harm local economies, such as by hurting public school quality and thus the skills of local
workers.
Incentive reforms should rein in costs while promoting job growth. I make three
recommendations:
1. Put budget caps on tax incentives. These caps help avoid financing incentives
through cuts in important services such as public education. When public school
spending is cut, future wages tend to fall.
2. Restrict tax incentives by targeting only high-multiplier industries. Tax
incentives can make sense if, for every job created directly by the incentives, five
other local jobs are created—that is, the “job multiplier” is 6. Some industries,
particularly in advanced manufacturing, have higher multipliers and provide more
benefits per dollar of incentives.
3. Expand customized services to locally owned, small and medium-sized
businesses. Customized business services such as specialized job training and
manufacturing extension can be 10 times as effective as tax incentives in creating
local jobs. These services are most useful to small and medium-sized businesses,
which often lack the funds and information of larger businesses. Locally owned
businesses spend more on nearby suppliers and retailers, further boosting local
job creation.
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Incentives financed by
cuts in public schools
reduce per-capita income
of state residents by over 4
percent.

The Effects of Different Economic Development Incentive Policies
To compare different incentive reforms, I conduct several “thought experiments”
that illustrate how a specific reform affects a key outcome: the average incomes of a
state’s residents. For an apples-to-apples comparison, I assume each policy involves the
government offering incentives equal to 1 percent of the state’s personal income each
year. This magnitude is in line with the offerings of high-incentive states and localities.
I create a baseline incentive policy against which to compare reforms. This baseline
policy makes two assumptions that reflect characteristics of typical incentive policies:
• The baseline incentive policy is paid for by an even split of increased taxes and
public spending cuts. This choice is arbitrary but neutral. Based on average state
and local budget patterns, 11 percent of financing comes from cuts in K–12
education spending alone.
• For every job created directly by the incentives, 1.5 other local jobs are created in
supplier industries and local retailers. This means the job multiplier is 2.5, which is
common for average manufacturing industries.
Figure 1 shows how residents’ per-capita incomes change for four different incentive
policies: the baseline policy and three alternative “thought experiment” policies.
The baseline incentive policy has slight net benefits. Per-capita income rises by 0.2
percent. The incentive policy creates jobs for residents, increases property values, and
generates tax revenue. But it also has a high cost per job created. The additional revenue
does not fully cover the policy’s sticker price, and the share of incentives financed by cuts
in public school spending reduces future wages.
Now consider the same tax incentives, with one change: the incentive package is
solely financed by cuts in public school spending. This policy reduces average percapita income of residents by over 4 percent. The short-term benefits of more jobs are
outweighed by the long-term losses in wages due to public school spending cuts.
Suppose we return to the baseline incentive financing, but assume that tax incentives
are targeted at industries with a job multiplier of 6.0 rather than 2.5. Some high-tech
Figure 1 How Four Different Incentive Policies Affect State Residents: Percentage
Effects on Per-Capita Income
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NOTE: These four incentive policies all have the same cost: 1 percent of total personal income of state residents.
SOURCE: Executive Summary to Bartik (2018).
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Average tax incentives
tip less than one-fifth
of business location
decisions.
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manufacturing may have multipliers as great as 6.0. Such high multipliers are in part
due to what are called “agglomeration economies” or “cluster effects”: a local cluster of
high-tech firms can benefit from transferring ideas and workers among each other, and
from local specialized services. With the higher multiplier, this incentive policy increases
per-capita income by 3 percent, more than 10 times the baseline incentive policy.
Finally, instead of a tax incentive, suppose we provide customized services to locally
owned small and medium-sized businesses. These services may include specialized job
training and manufacturing extension services. Studies have found these customized
services, when done well, can have job-creation effects 10 times those of tax incentives.
Because of the target of local businesses, any expansion of sales at assisted businesses may
come at the expense of reduced sales at other competing local businesses. However, this
is counterbalanced by locally owned businesses and their owners spending more at local
suppliers and retailers. This policy increases residents’ per-capita incomes by almost 6
percent—over 25 times the baseline tax incentive package.

The Advantage of Data-Driven Simulation over Development Agency Assumptions
These estimates come from a simulation model built on credible studies of how
incentives and job creation affect local economies. Essentially, the model uses the
findings of these studies to determine how incentive design affects local job creation,
per-capita income, and other local economic outcomes. These outcomes are linked
in a causal chain. For example, an incentive policy has some probability of tipping a
business location decision, and when scaled by the number of jobs targeted, yields the
expected number of local jobs created. Each of these created local jobs in turn can create
additional jobs through the job multiplier effect, through either suppliers to the targeted
firm or local retailers who sell to the firm’s workers. Some of these new jobs go to local
residents and increase earnings, while other jobs go to people who move into the area
and thus affect population growth. Research has shown that for every increase of 10 local
jobs, local population will eventually rise sufficiently that 8 extra jobs go to in-migrant
workers.
The new jobs increase state and local tax revenue, but the added population requires
additional spending on public services to maintain quality. The extra tax revenue less the
required spending represents a fiscal benefit to the government. This fiscal benefit offsets
the incentive’s “sticker price”—the dollars either paid to incented firms or forgone from
not collecting taxes from them. If the fiscal benefit is less than the sticker price, there
is a net budget cost for the incentive, which must be paid for; for example, by cutting
some other public service (such as education). The model’s power comes from flexibility
in considering alternatives such as how net budget costs are paid for, the size of the job
multiplier, and the cost-effectiveness of economic development programs in creating jobs
in targeted firms.
In contrast, economic development agencies often make simpler assumptions that are
not research based. For instance, economic developers often assume that every new job
created in assisted firms is due to the incentives; that is, it would not have been created
“but for” the incentives. Credible studies, however, find that average-sized tax incentives
tip less than one-fifth of business location decisions, implying that most targeted jobs
would have been created even without the incentives.
Moreover, economic developers often take credit for increases in tax revenue but
ignore the effects of extra population on public spending. Studies show, however, that
growth-induced spending needs can absorb upwards of 90 percent of the additional tax
revenue, and the simulation model takes this into account. Similarly, while economic
developers often use the sticker price of incentives as their cost, this can understate the
true costs by failing to account for the economic costs of paying for incentives, such
as cuts in public spending. As noted above, the simulation factors in these costs. For
example, empirical estimates show that a 10 percent cut in K–12 education spending will
decrease future wages by 8 percent.
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Customized business
services can create jobs at
one-tenth the cost of tax
incentives.

Additionally, economic development policymakers often focus on the short term,
but the costs from cutting education or other spending can take a generation to be fully
realized. The simulation accounts for incentive effects over 80 years. Finally, although
more than 90 percent of incentives are tax incentives, specialized business services
(such as customized job training or manufacturing extension) can also help create jobs,
especially for local small and medium-sized businesses. What’s more, these customized
services can create jobs at one-tenth the cost of tax incentives, and the simulation
analyzes both policies.
One potential drawback to the simulation approach is that the results may be sensitive
to different, but still plausible, assumptions. The full report shows that alternative
assumptions can change the magnitude of results, but that the general implications hold
up. For instance, consider the effects on state residents’ incomes of fully financing tax
incentives through public school spending cuts. This mechanism reduces incomes even
if the effects of spending cuts on future wages are only one-seventh of what is assumed
in the simulation. As another example, customized business services to locally owned
businesses still have positive effects on incomes even if such services have a job-creation
effectiveness only one-sixth as great as in the simulation.

Political Challenges of Reforming Incentive Policy
These recommended incentive reforms face political challenges. Demand for tax
incentives is unlimited: any business would like the government to provide it with as
much cash as possible. In contrast, customized business services are demanded only by
the relatively few businesses that find such services useful, usually small and mediumsized businesses at some critical development stage.
Therefore, the political pressure is to expand tax incentives because they have more
and larger beneficiaries. But from the perspective of promoting better public policy,
customized business services offer an advantage: businesses will clamor for them only if
they are perceived to be productive. This provides pressure for development agencies to
keep the quality up.
Another political challenge is that tax incentives often have short-run benefits but
long-run costs. Governors and mayors are tempted to give away their successors’ tax base
to obtain short-term political benefits from immediate job growth. The full cost, in lower
future wages from lower education spending, will be realized only many years later. This
political bias toward the short-term can be countered if news media and interest groups
encourage a greater focus on what best promotes economic development over the long
term.
Timothy J. Bartik is a senior economist at the Upjohn Institute.
Support for this project was provided by The Pew Charitable Trusts. The views expressed herein are
those of the author, and do not necessarily reflect official views of The Pew Charitable Trusts or the
Upjohn Institute.
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